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Entropy and typical properties of Nash equilibria in two-player games
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We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties
of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed
bound, we calculate their number and analyse the properties of typical Nash equilibria, which are
exponentially dominant in number. We find that a randomly chosen equilibrium realizes almost
always equal payoffs to either player. This value and the fraction of strategies played at an equi-
librium point are calculated as a function of the correlation between the two payoff matrices. The
picture is complemented by the calculation of the properties of Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
PACS numbers: 05.20-y, 02.50.Le, 64.60.C
Game theory seeks to model problems of strategic decision-making arising in economics, sociology, or international
relations. In the generic set-up, a number of players choose between different strategies, the combination of which
determines the outcome of the game specified by the payoff to each player. Contrary to the situation in ordinary
optimization problems, these payoffs are in general different for different players leading to a competitive situation
where each player tries to maximize his individual payoff. One of the cornerstones of modern economics and game
theory is therefore the concept of a Nash equilibrium [3], see also [4], which describes a situation where no player can
unilaterally improve his payoff by changing his individual strategy given the other players all stick to their strategies.
However this concept is thought to suffer from the serious drawback that in a typical game-theoretical situation there
is a large number of Nash equilibria with different characteristics but no means of telling which one will be chosen by
the players, as would be required of a predictive theory.
This conceptual problem already shows up in the paradigmatic model of a bimatrix game between two players
X and Y where player X chooses strategy i ∈ (1 . . .N) with probability xi ≥ 0 and player Y chooses strategy
j ∈ (1 . . . N) with probability yj ≥ 0. The vectors x = (x1, ..., xN ), y = (y1, ..., yN) are called mixed strategies and
are constrained to the (N − 1)-dimensional simplex by normalization. For a pair of pure strategies (i, j) the payoff to
player X is given by the corresponding entry in his payoff matrix aij whereas the payoff to player Y is given by bij .
The expected payoff to player X is thus given by νx(x,y) =
∑
i,j xiaijyj and analogously for player Y . Every player
has the intention to maximize his own payoff. A Nash equilibrium (NE) (x,y) is defined by
νx(x,y) = maxx′ νx(x
′,y)
νy(x,y) = maxy′ νy(x,y
′) (1)
since in this situation there exists no mixed strategy x which will increase the expected payoff to X given Y does not
alter his strategy and vice versa for Y . Thus no player has an incentive to unilaterally change his strategy.
Apart from applications in economics, politics, sociology, and mathematical biology, there exists a wide body of
mathematical literature on bimatrix games concerned with fundamental topics such as exact bounds for e.g. the
number of NE [5] and efficient algorithms for locating them [6]. For games even of moderate size a large number of
NE are found, forming a set of disconnected points. In general the different NE all correspond to different payoffs to
the players.
However many situations of interest are characterized by a large number of possible strategies and complicated
relations between the strategic choices of the players and the resulting payoffs. In such cases it is tempting to model
the payoffs by random matrices in order to calculate typical properties of the game. This idea is frequently used in the
statistical mechanics approach to complex systems such as spin glasses [7,8], neural networks [9], evolutionary models
[10], or hard optimization problems [11]. Recently this approach has been used to investigate the typical properties
of so-called zero-sum games [12].
In this Letter we investigate the properties of Nash equilibria in large bimatrix games with random payoffs, i.e.
with random entries of the payoff matrices. Using techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems
we estimate the number of NE with a given payoff. We find that the NE are exponentially dominated in number by
equilibria with a certain payoff.
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In this approach characteristics of the game are encoded in the distribution of payoff matrices – with only a few
parameters – instead of the payoff matrices themselves. Clearly the choice of the probability distribution to be
averaged over can influence the results. However a number of simplifying observations may be made: the two payoff
matrices may be multiplied by any constant or have any constant added to them without changing the properties of
the game in any material way. Thus there is no loss of generality involved in considering payoffs of order N−1/2 and
of zero mean. We assume that the entries of the payoff matrices at different sites are identically and independently
distributed. In the thermodynamic limit one finds that only the first two moments of the payoff distribution are
relevant so the entries of the payoff matrices may be considered to be Gaussian distributed. The only property of the
distribution of payoffs which is not fixed by these specifications is the correlation κ between entries of the same site
of the two payoff matrices. We thus choose the entries of the payoff matrices to be drawn randomly according to the
probability distribution
p({aij}, {bij}) =
∏
ij
N
2pi
√
1− κ2 exp
(
−N(a
2
ij − 2κaijbij + b2ij)
2(1− κ2)
)
, (2)
i.e. a Gaussian distribution with zero mean, variance 1/N and correlation aijbkl = κδikδjl/N for all pairs (i, j) and
(k, l). Here and in the following, the overbar · denotes the average over the payoff distribution (2).
Thus for κ = −1 one finds a Dirac-delta factor δ(aij + bij) in (2) corresponding to a zero-sum game. κ = 0
corresponds to uncorrelated payoff matrices and κ = 1 gives the so-called symmetric case aij = bij where the two
players always receive identical payoffs. The parameter κ consequently describes the degree of similarity between the
payoffs to either player and may be used to continuously tune the game from a zero-sum game to a purely symmetric
one. The former admits no cooperation at all between the players. Negative κ correspond to an on average competitive
situation, whereas for increasing κ there are more and more pairs of strategies which are beneficial to both players.
As a starting point for the statistical mechanics calculations, we remark that (1) is equivalent to the set of inequalities∑
j
aijyj − νx(x,y) ≤ 0 ∀i
∑
i
xibij − νy(x,y) ≤ 0 ∀j . (3)
Due to the non-negativity of the probabilities xi and yj this directly results in the local equations specifying a NE
with payoffs νx and νy
xi

∑
j
aijyj − νx

 = 0 (∑j aijyj − νx) ≤ 0 ∀i
yj
(∑
i
xibij − νy
)
= 0 (
∑
i xibij − νy) ≤ 0 ∀j . (4)
We introduce real-valued variables x˜ and y˜ with xi = x˜iΘ(x˜i) (where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step-function) and likewise
for yj . Then the last conditions (4) may be written as
Ixi (x˜, y˜) = x˜iΘ(−x˜i)− (
∑
j aij y˜jΘ(y˜j)− νx) = 0
Iyj (x˜, y˜) = y˜jΘ(−y˜j)− (
∑
j x˜iΘ(x˜i)bij − νy) = 0 , (5)
i.e. we have constructed indicator functions Ixi and I
y
i which are zero at a NE (x,y) and non-zero elsewhere [13].
The number N (νx, νy) of NE with payoffs νx and νy may thus be calculated from
N (νx, νy) =
∫
dx˜ dy˜ δ
(∑
i
x˜iΘ(x˜i)−N
)
δ

∑
j
y˜jΘ(y˜j)−N

∏
i
δ (Ixi (x˜, y˜))
∏
j
δ
(
Iyj (x˜, y˜)
) ∥∥∥∥∂(Ix, Iy)∂(x˜, y˜)
∥∥∥∥ , (6)
where the mixed strategies have been rescaled to
∑
i xi =
∑
j yj = N for convenience. Although we expect an
exponential number of NE, so lnN is an extensive quantity, we calculate the so-called annealed average lnN instead
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of the quenched one lnN . This gives an exact upper bound to the typical number of NE at given payoffs 1. Using
integral representations of the delta functions in (6), averaging over the disorder (2), and introducing the order
parameters qx = N−1
∑
i x˜
2
iΘ(x˜i), R
x = N−1
∑
i ixˆix˜iΘ(x˜i), and similarly for player Y we obtain
N (νx, νy) =
∫
dqx,ydqˆx,y
(2pi/N)2
∫
dEx,y
(2pi/N)2
∫
dRx,y
2pi/(Nκ)
exp{iN(qxqˆx + qyqˆy − κRxRy + Ex + Ey)}
∫ ∏
i
dx˜idxˆi
(2pi)
∫ ∏
j
dy˜jdyˆj
(2pi)
exp
{
− iqˆ
x
2
∑
i
x˜2iΘ(x˜i) + iκR
y
∑
i
ixˆix˜iΘ(x˜i)− q
y
2
∑
i
xˆ2i
−i
∑
i
x˜ixˆiΘ(−xi)− iνx
∑
i
xˆi − iEx
∑
i
x˜iΘ(xi) + (x↔ y with iRy → Rx)
}
‖ det(B)‖ , (7)
with H(x) =
∫∞
x
dx′ exp(−x′2/2)/√2pi. Here we have used the assumption that the normalizing determinant
‖ det(B)‖ = ‖∂(Ix,Iy)∂(x˜,y˜) ‖ is self-averaging and is effectively uncorrelated with the rest of expression (7) and may therefore
be averaged over the disorder independently of the rest of the expression [13] 2. We obtain
‖ det(B)‖ = exp
{
N
2
(px ln px − px + py ln py − py)
}
, (8)
where the fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability px = N
−1
∑
iΘ(x˜i) is determined self-consistently
by introducing px, py and their conjugates pˆx, pˆy in (7). After the transformation iqˆ
x,y → qˆx,y and similarly for
Ex,y, pˆx,y, Ry, the integrals over x˜, xˆ, y˜, yˆ may be performed. In the limit of large payoff matrices N → ∞, the
integrals over the order parameters are dominated by their saddle point. Furthermore (7) is now symmetric under an
interchange of the players, and the maximum (and hence exponentially in N dominating) number of NE is found at
equal payoffs to each player. Thus it makes sense to restrict the analysis to the case νx = νy = ν. We obtain
Sκ(ν) =
1
N
lnN (ν, ν) = 2 extrq,qˆ,R,E,p
[
qqˆ
2
− κR
2
2
− p
2
+ ln
(
H
(
− ν√
q
)
+
√
p
qqˆ + κ2R2
exp
{
−ν
2
2q
+
(E − κRν/q)2
2qˆ + 2κ2R2/q
}
H
(
E − κRν/q√
qˆ + κ2R2/q
))]
(9)
From this expression the statistical properties of the entire spectrum of player-symmetric NE may be deduced. In the
thermodynamic limit, a randomly chosen NE will give the payoff ν = νy = νx = argmaxSκ(ν) with probability one,
because the number of NE with this payoff N (ν, ν) = exp{NmaxSκ(ν)} is exponentially larger than the number of all
other NE. Similarly, the self-overlap q =
∑
i x
2
i =
∑
j x
2
j and the fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability
p = px = py will take on their saddle-point values of (9) evaluated at the maximum of Sκ(ν) with probability one.
1The annealed approximation does not differ by more than 3% in the entropy and by 10% in the order parameters from the
results of the more complicated replica calculation of the quenched average, which will be presented elsewhere.
2This assumption ha been verified by explicitly including the calculation of the effective normalizing determinant into the
disorder average.
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FIG. 1. The entropy Sκ of the NE which exponentially dominate the spectrum Sκ(ν). The analytic results are compared
with numerical simulations for N = 18 averaged over 100 samples.
Figure 1 shows the entropy Sκ at the maximum of Sκ(ν) as a function of κ. The numerical results were obtained
by enumerating all NE for N=18 [6,14]. Given that enumeration is only possible for small sample sizes, the agreement
between the annealed approximation and the numerical results is quite good.
Figure 2 shows the payoff ν and the fraction p of strategies played with non-zero probability again as a function of
κ. The numerical results were obtained for N=50 by using the iterated Lemke-Howson algorithm [15,6], which locates
a single but typical NE. The deviation between analytic and numerical results may be accounted for by the use of the
annealed calculation and finite-size effects.
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FIG. 2. The payoff ν (solid line) and the fraction p of strategies played with non-zero probability (dashed line). The analytic
results are compared with numerical simulations for N = 50 averaged over 200 samples.
For zero-sum games (κ = −1) there is only a single NE [12] so Sκ=0 = 0, and the payoff is zero due to the symmetry
between the players. As κ is increased the number of NE rises. The maximum of the typical number of NE is reached
for the case of symmetric games, where Sκ=1 ∼ 0.362. This result may be compared with a rigorous upper bound
derived using geometric methods [5,6], which states that for any non-degenerate N -by-N bimatrix game with large N
there are at most e0.955N equilibrium points. Thus the typical-case scenario investigated here does not saturate this
bound.
The increase of ν with κ may be understood as follows: At increasing κ the outcome of a pair of strategies (i, j)
which is beneficial to player X say, tends to become more beneficial to player Y . As a result players focus on these
strategies and the payoff to both players rises. By the same token the fraction p of strategies which are played with
non-zero probability at a NE decreases with κ and the self-overlap of the mixed strategies q increases.
Even though the properties of the NE at a given κ are dominated by the peak of Sκ(ν), there is an important
qualitative difference between the curves of different values of κ. For −1 < κ < κc ∼ −.59, Sκ(ν) reaches its
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maximum and then decreases crossing the S = 0 axis at some point. For κ > κc however, Sκ(ν → ∞) → 0+ and
p→ 0+. Hence there is an exponential number of NE offering an arbitrarily large (but finite) payoff to either player.
This observation can be corroborated by considering the extreme case of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) (i, j)
where each player only plays a single (pure) strategy [16], i.e. xi = Nδi′i, yj = Nδj′j , ∀i′, j′ = 1, ..., N . According
to (3), a PSNE corresponds to a site (i, j) which is simultaneously a maximum of the column ai′j and a maximum of
the corresponding row of bij′ . The average of the number M of PSNE is thus given by
M =
∑
ij
∏
k 6=i
Θ(aij − akj)
∏
l 6=j
Θ(bij − bil)
= N2
∫
da db p(a, b)HN−1(−
√
Na)HN−1(−
√
Nb) (10)
where p(a, b) denotes one of the Gaussian factors in (2).
Figure 3 shows the average number of PSNE as well as its variance as a function of κ. For N →∞ one finds from
(10) thatM scales with N2κ/(1+κ), so the number of PSNE vanishes for κ < 0, at κ = 0 there is on average 1 PSNE,
and for κ > 0 the number of PSNE diverges. The increase of the number of PSNE with κ may be understood as
follows. At low κ, a and b are anticorrelated, so in the extreme case κ = −1 a PSNE corresponds to a site (i, j) which
is simultaneously a maximum of the column ai′j and a minimum of the row aij′ = −bij′ . In the thermodynamic limit,
such points are exponentially rare. For large κ, the condition for a PSNE is much easier to fulfill and in the case
κ = +1, there is always at least one PSNE, namely the maximum entry of aij = bij .
Note that apart from the point κ = 0, the number of PSNE is also self-averaging as the relative sample-to-sample
fluctuations of M are found to vanish in the large N -limit. Furthermore for all κ > −1 the typical PSNE payoffs to
leading orders of N are found to be independent of κ, they are
√
N(2 lnN − ln lnN +O(1)).
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FIG. 3. Average numberM of PSNE for N = 25, 50, 100 (full, dashed, dotted lines). The lines show analytical result (10),
the symbols numerical results, averaged over 1000 samples. Inset: Numerical results for the logarithm of M (circles) and of
M2−M
2
with κ = 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 (bottom to top) against lnN . The dashed lines show the asymptotic slope 2κ/(1 + κ) ofM.
In conclusion we have used methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to describe the typical
properties of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. We find that in the thermodynamic
limit for a randomly chosen Nash equilibrium quantities such as the fraction of strategies played with non-zero
probability, the self-overlap of the mixed strategies and most importantly the payoff to either player take on a specific
value with probability 1. We have analytically calculated these quantities in the annealed approximation as a function
of the correlation κ between the payoff matrices and found good agreement with numerical simulations. Furthermore
the properties of Nash equilibria in pure strategies were calculated as a limiting case. A number of extensions of this
work may be considered, including the case where the players have different numbers of strategies at their disposal
and the generalisation to games of several players.
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